Legal Liability Issues of Mobile Application Relationships in Europe: Liability of mobile application distributors towards developers and end-users with regards to developers  stance as consumers by Kaptan, Türkan Hazal
  
Legal Liability Issues of Mobile Application 
Relationships in Europe 
Liability of mobile application distributors towards developers and end-users with 
regards to developers’ stance as consumers 
 
 
 
 
Candidate number: 8002 
Submission deadline: 01.12.2015 
Number of words: 17,327 
 
 I 
Table of contents 
1.	   INTRODUCTION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1	  
1.1.	   DERIVATION	  OF	  TOPIC	  OF	  DISSERTATION	   4	  
1.2.	   LEGAL	  BASIS	   6	  
1.3.	   LEGAL	  CONTEXT	   8	  
1.4.	   OUTLINE	  OF	  THE	  MAIN	  PART	   10	  
2.	   LIABILITY	  ISSUES	  IN	  MOBILE	  APPLICATION	  RELATIONSHIPS	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  
2.1.	   MOBILE	  APPLICATION	  CONTRACTS	  AND	  LEGAL	  SITUATION	  OF	  THE	  PARTIES	  OF	  MOBILE	  
APPLICATION	  RELATIONSHIPS	   11	  
2.2.	   POLICY	  CONSIDERATIONS	   21	  
2.3.	   NOTION	  OF	  “CONSUMER”	   25	  
2.3.1.	   NOTION	  OF	  “CONSUMER”	  IN	  EUROPEAN	  CONSUMER	  ACQUIS	   26	  
2.3.2.	   MOBILE	  APPLICATION	  DEVELOPERS’	  STANCE	  AS	  CONSUMER	   30	  
2.4.	   LIABILITY	  ISSUES	  IN	  MOBILE	  APPLICATION	  CONTRACTS	   34	  
2.4.1.	   WHEN	  THE	  DEVELOPER	  IS	  A	  CONSUMER	   36	  
2.4.1.1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  LIABILITY	  IN	  	  MOBILE	  APPLICATION	  DISTRIBUTION	  AGREEMENTS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  
CONTRAC	  TED	  	  WITH	  CONSUMER	  DEVELOPERS	  
2.4.1.2.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  LIABILITY	  IN	  	  END-­‐USER	  LICENSE	  AGREEMENTS	  CONTRACTED	  	  WITH	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  
CONSUMER	  DEVELOPERS	  
2.4.1.3.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  LIABILITY	  IN	  	  TERMS	  OF	  SERVICES	  AGREEMENTS	  CONTRACTED	  	  WITH	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  
CONSUMER	  DEVELOPERS	  
2.4.2.	   WHEN	  THE	  DEVELOPER	  IS	  NOT	  A	  CONSUMER	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   47	  
2.4.2.1.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  LIABILITY	  IN	  	  MOBILE	  APPLICATION	  DISTRIBUTION	  AGREEMENTS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  
CONTRAC	  TED	  	  WITH	  NON-­‐CONSUMER	  DEVELOPERS	  
2.4.2.2.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  LIABILITY	  IN	  	  END-­‐USER	  LICENSE	  AGREEMENTS	  CONTRACTED	  	  WITH	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  
NON-­‐CONSUMER	  DEVELOPERS	  
2.4.2.3.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  LIABILITY	  IN	  	  TERMS	  OF	  SERVICES	  AGREEMENTS	  CONTRACTED	  	  WITH	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  
NON-­‐CONSUMER	  DEVELOPERS	  
3.	   CONCLUSION	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  
 II 
4.	   TABLE	  OF	  REFERENCE	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
The replacement of classical cellular phones with smartphones brought about the boom of 
mobile applications, software designed to function on mobile operating systems as well as 
other portable devices. Some mobile applications are a part of the mobile operating sys-
tems, for instance an apple smartphone, namely an iPhone, which utilizes mobile operating 
system IOS, come with several mobile applications, like Camera, Calculator, Find my 
Friend applications, installed in the device prior to purchase.  
A numerous amount of applications are marketed through mobile application distribution 
platforms, such as App Store in Apple’s, Google Play Store in Samsung Android devices’ 
cases. Developers of the applications place their applications on distribution platforms by 
virtue of mobile application dealing between him and the distributors, distribution platform 
operators. By such virtue, the end-users, users of smartphones, obtain the opportunity to get 
to know, and download  the applications for free or for a purchase fee.  
A typical mobile distribution relationship consists of three electronic contracts; the distribu-
tion agreement, the EULA (hereafter termed as EULAs) and the terms of services. All of 
the three contracts are concluded via Internet. Pursuant to the Electronic Commerce Di-
rective1, mobile application distribution services constitute “information society services”2. 
Consequently, distributors providing the services are to be classified as “information socie-
ty service” providers3. 
Conforming to a statistical study, the number of worldwide mobile application downloads 
is expected to surpass 224 billion by 20164. Considering that the distributors of mobile ap-
                                                
 
1 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000  
2 Electronic Commerce Directive art.2(a) adopts art. 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC’s definition of information 
society services, namely as “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic 
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services“.  
3 Electronic Commerce Directive art.2(a) and (b) 
4 Statista (2013)  
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plication distribution platforms were launched a short while ago5, the mentioned displays 
the pace, in which mobile applications became popular. Indeed, nowadays, mobile applica-
tion transactions have become as frequent as day-to-day purchases of food or hygienic 
products.  
Nevertheless, while defects in the latter goods have been made subject to countless litiga-
tion processes, defects in mobile applications or damages caused thereby are hardly made 
subject to legal actions. Although, according to a survey, more than half of mobile applica-
tion users experience a problem6. Therefore, mobile application transactions are far from 
having satisfactory results for the majority of end-users. 
The basic failures common to all mobile application end-users are bugs, errors, crashes, 
slowness and, in mobile interaction with real word (MIRW)7 applications’ case, problems 
with features related to global positioning service (GPS), compass, camera and network 
connection, namely failures related to technical functionality8. Additionally end-user expe-
rience dissatisfaction may result from the content, interaction experiences, compatibility, 
overall usefulness, customer service or privacy features9.  
A reason for European end-users’ hesitation in starting a litigation process regarding de-
fects in mobile applications might be the monetary insignificance of the losses caused by 
applications. However for MIWR applications utilizing GPS services, the lack of adequate 
information, may lead to substantial damages, even fatal consequences.  
The dissatisfaction in user experiences regarding mobile applications, need not always arise 
from a certain defect in the digital good itself which can be controlled by the end-user. In 
certain situations, the manner of marketing/distribution of an application, too, can cause 
some complications in user experience. For instance, the dissatisfaction regarding technical 
                                                
 
5 Apple App Store and Google Play were established in 2008 while  Amazon Appstore was launched in 2011. 
6 Compuware (2012) p. 6 
7 Salo(2013) p.1113 
8 Salo(2013) p.1118 
9 ibid. 
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functionalities, compatibility and content may result from the mobile application distribu-
tors’ delay in approving the update thereof, without which updates cannot be transmitted to 
end-users.  
On this wise, the liability situations, especially arising as a result of distributors’ actions 
constitute a legal controversy with regards to mobile application relationships. Mobile ap-
plication distributors, typically, make use of disclaimer of warranties in addition to indem-
nification clauses to deny all responsibility from any action they take, be it against devel-
opers or end-users.  
Therefore, when applied literally, mobile application contracts bring about seemingly un-
fair situations for both developers and end-users. This may, as well, constitute a further 
reason to consumers’ reservations with respect to taking an action against unsatisfactory 
mobile applications and services thereof.  
The coming chapters will discuss the related situation with regards to distributors’ denial of 
responsibility thereof. 
The majority of the mobile application distributors are based in the U.S., where with pursu-
ance to contractual freedom principle, the consumer law offers minimum protection. On 
this wise, distributors’ adoption of the above mentioned rather farfetched exemption claus-
es may be grounded on a possible assumption of the other contractual parties’ stances as 
consumers would not change the agreed terms of a contract. 
 European consumers, however, are granted a better protection against such terms, since the 
European Union regulates protection of consumers via mandatory rules that have priority 
with regards to contractual freedom. Notwithstanding, as defects in mobile applications are 
not commonly brought before the courts, to what extend the protection of European con-
sumer acquis is applicable to mobile apps, is yet to be determined by jurisprudence. Corre-
spondingly, mentioned will be dealt in the discussion hereafter.  
Having said that, regarding their relationships with developers, it is likely that distributors 
presuppose that at least the majority of developers are non-consumers. For that reason, the 
 4 
consequences of the seemingly unfair liability terms, in contracts they offer to the develop-
ers, might have been overlooked by distributors. The validity of mentioned presumption 
will also be further assessed in following chapters. 
This paper assess to what extend the European Union law, particularly the consumer ac-
quis, permits the aforementioned auspicious position of the distributors. On this wise, the 
discussion will focus on how and whether the liability situations, of all mobile application 
relationship actors, change when developers are classified as consumers according to Euro-
pean consumer acquis.   
1.1. Derivation of topic of dissertation 
Supposing a mobile application distributor does not take the preventive measures to protect 
its distribution platform against online attacks, when a mobile application and it’s end-users 
are impaired as a result of a general attack on the platform, the fault thereof is evidently the 
distributor’s. On this wise, an online attack aiming a distribution platform as a whole might 
render some applications inaccessible, impede the in application payment systems or may 
result to some data protection infringement. Therefore, the losses suffered thereof might be 
substantial for both developers and end-users, thusly rendering the allocation of liability 
crucial. 
However, due to contractual freedom, liability in contractual obligations can be transferred 
regardless of the culpable party. Accordingly, the majority of mobile application distribu-
tion agreements have clauses which transfer all responsibility of distributors to developers. 
Hence, the distribution contracts, including all that is focused on by this paper, designate 
the developer to be accountable to end-users in cases such as the above mentioned.  
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Aforesaid may be legally valid in the USA, where most of the distributors are founded10, 
nevertheless some jurisdictions, like European Member States’, hold such seemingly unfair 
terms unenforceable with regards to consumers. 
Hence, the importance of classifying a developer as consumer emerges in situations where 
the unfair liability terms he/she had agreed burdens him/her responsible from another per-
son’s actions, which he/she has no control over. For in such situations, designating the de-
veloper as consumer renders the relationship between him and the distributor as a consumer 
transaction. In Europe, consumer transactions are controlled via mandatory terms regulated 
by legal instruments, such as the Unfair Terms Directive. The provisions of the said Di-
rective prevents the powerful parties of a contract, distributors in the topic at hand, from 
abusing their dominant situations, namely by holding unfair liability terms unenforceable. 
Classifying developers as consumers affects also the legal validity of their dealing with 
end-users. An end-user license agreement (hereafter EULA) between a consumer end-user 
residing in European territory and a mobile application developer, who is not a consumer, 
is subject to European consumer protection. On the other hand, EULAs contracted with 
non-consumer developers would constitute C2C agreements, and thusly fall out of the 
scope of consumer law. This, evidently, deprives end-users from certain protection while 
bringing about a broader assessment of unfairness regarding the terms of service agree-
ments between them and distributors. 
This paper assesses the liability issues in similar situations, according to the European law, 
where the damage is brought about by the faulty actions of the distributor, examining how 
the liability situation changes according to the stance of the developer as a consumer. On 
this wise, the following chapters will demonstrate the struggle of balancing the relevant 
interests in constituting the contractual freedom and protecting the weak.  
                                                
 
10 As stated under Apple Info visited at http://www.apple.com/about/, and About Google visited at 
https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/6034670?p=about_play&rd=1&hl=en-GB  
 
 
 6 
1.2.  Legal basis 
The subject matter of this paper congregates around two central legal issues. The first of 
these issues considers mobile application developers’ position as a consumer in the con-
tractual relationship between them and the distributors. The second one deals with the un-
fairness of the liability clauses regarding the whole mobile application distribution relation-
ship. 
Prior to an explanation of the mentioned issues, the relevance of European consumer law as 
regards to mobile application contract should be examined. The Rome I Regulation of the 
European Parliament on the applicable law to contractual obligations designates the law of 
the countries in which consumers habitually reside, as applicable to consumer contracts11. 
On this wise, the Regulation demands the professionals to either pursue their activities in or 
direct them to consumers’ country of habitual residence, for it to be the governing law12. 
To this extend, when a consumer, who resides within the territory of the European Union, 
enters into an agreement with a mobile application distributor or the developer, the contrac-
tual relationship thereupon is governed by European consumer acquis. Consequently, dis-
cussion in the following chapters assumes the consumer party of the contract at hand to be 
a habitual residence in Europe. 
European law regulates rules regarding consumer contracts via several directives. The most 
recent directive is the Consumer Protection Directive13, which replaces the directives on the 
distance contracts14 and contracts negotiated away from business premises15. Relevance of 
                                                
 
11 Rome I Regulation art 6(1) 
12 Rome I Regulation art 6(1)(a) and (b) 
13 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer      
rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council 
14 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts 
15 Council Directive of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away 
from business premises (85/577/EEC) 
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the mentioned Directive, with regards to liability clauses in mobile distribution contracts, 
arises concerning the designation of a party thereof as consumer.  
The notion of “consumer” in European consumer acquis is defined in a, rather, inconsistent 
manner. In the course of time, consumer definitions provided by various directives, before 
the Consumer Protection Directive, have become inadequate to Web 2.0. environments. 
Thusly, being prepared recently, Consumer Protection Directive is expected to demonstrate 
European law makers’ intentions regarding definition of consumer in the era of e-
commerce. Therefore, this paper will take account of the mentioned Directive’s consumer 
definition, together with several uncertainties thereof, while designating, especially, mobile 
application developers’ stance as consumers.  
The above mentioned designation of developers as consumers has many effects on mobile 
application distribution agreements, one of which is the enforceability of their terms. The 
Unfair Terms Directive16 regulates the mentioned enforcement issues about standard terms 
of consumer contracts. Hence, the liability clauses of mobile distribution agreements, for as 
much as they are consumer contracts, would also be subject to the rules of Unfair Terms 
Directive. Accordingly, the assessment hereafter will give special consideration to the re-
quirements and provisions of the said Directive. 
Following chapters will explain that mobile distributors constitute information society ser-
vice operators, providing hosting services in addition to cloud services in several levels. 
Said renders the rules of Electronic Commerce Directive also applicable to contracts  dis-
tributors conclude with end-users and developers. In such wise, when assessing the liability 
situation in mentioned agreements, the Directive’s liability rules, namely safe harbour regu-
lations, too, will be considered. 
Today, launching a mobile application distribution platform is as easy as launching a web-
site, hosting some mobile software. Accordingly, there are countless platforms providing 
                                                
 
16 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
 8 
mobile application distribution services, be it operating system-native or third-party plat-
forms17. However, owing to practical reasons, this paper will focus solely on Apple’s App 
Store, Google Play Store and Amazon App Store. To this extend, agreements provided by 
mentioned platforms are taken as samples to the contracts and terms assessed in this paper. 
As explained in the previously, the rules constituting the legal basis to this paper are ger-
mane to European Union Community law. The discussion generated hereafter is estab-
lished on the general instruments of the European Union law, such as directives and regula-
tions, rather than the individual application of the Member States thereof. Therefore, the 
judicial reaction to the same situation, discussed in the paper, may vary from Member State 
to Member State. The regulation in the different member states falls outside the scoop of 
this paper. 
1.3. Legal context 
Despite the many opportunities it suggests regarding businesses, clients and start-ups, the 
electronic commerce also presents many legal challenges. In the internet it is not always 
possible to designate when, where and by whom an action is taken. On this wise, the deter-
ritorialisation18, detemporalisation19, dematerialisation20 and depersonalisation21 in the elec-
tronic environments bring about many controversies regarding the forming of electronic 
contracts, for instance the disputes on what constitutes an offer of an acceptance.  
Protection of consumer from unfair clauses forms one of the fundamental areas of electron-
ic commerce law. The widespread use of internet has converted the purchasing needs and 
habits of consumers. Accordingly, their protection has become one of the central struggles 
of European law makers with regards to electronic commerce. The Internet compels con-
sumers agree to an increasing amount of terms, be it by a click wrap format to purchase a 
                                                
 
17 Wikipedia (2015) 
18 Hoeren (2005) p. 48 
19 Hoeren (2005) p. 50 
20 Hoeren (2005) p. 47 
21 Hoeren (2005) p. 51 
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goods, product or a browse wrap format to navigate in a website. By this way, consumers 
are exposed to more standard terms every day, increasing the chances for them to agree 
more to seemingly unfair clauses, large enterprises force on them by making use of their 
lack of knowledge or bargaining power.  
Another ambiguity, produced especially by the deterritorialisation aspect of electronic 
commerce, concerns jurisdiction and applicable law22. The situation may look clearer in 
relation to the large enterprises making use of jurisdiction and governing law clauses incor-
porated in standard terms they provide to customers. Likewise, the majority of the mobile 
application distributors, too, use such jurisdiction clauses23. However, when the other party 
of the contract is a consumer residing in a different jurisdiction then the designated, said 
clauses might generate inequitable results. The terms discussed by this paper are only some 
of the many such terms.  
At the same time, the advent in user generated content in the Internet rendered liability is-
sues, such as the responsibility of intermediaries from third party infringements, one of the 
highly regulated issues regarding the electronic commerce. Whereas a separate liability 
dispute, concerning the aforementioned intermediaries and other electronic commerce ser-
vice providers, arises regarding the enforceability of the unfair disclaimers utilized by 
them. 
The mobile application relationship constitutes a sub-category to the electronic commerce. 
Similarly, since the contracts, governing the mentioned relationship, are concluded via 
electronic means, they classify as electronic contracts. Therefore, abovementioned issues 
prevail also in mobile application relationships’ cases. Especially concerning the implica-
tions of mobile applications like health apps, liability issues thereof tend to have colossal 
effects.  
                                                
 
22 Rodríguez (2010) p.2 
23 IOS Developer Program License Agreement art. 15.10,  Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement 
art.  15.7, Amazon App Distribution and Services Agreement art.13 
 10 
Another contemporaneous matter in mobile applications concerns is the data protection 
rules, especially of Europe.  Any damage incurring by end-users with relation to data pro-
tection may amount to substantial losses and liabilities. Therefore, in likely cases designa-
tion of liability constitutes a place of grave importance.  
Designation of a party of a contractual relationship is particularly important with regards to 
jurisdiction and applicable law issues, as regulations on these issues assigns exceptional 
rules to consumer contracts. However, as the said regulations constitute procedural law, the 
criterion adopted by said rules to designate a party as consumer is not the same with the 
benchmarks taken in the topic at hand.  
Data protection law concerns data subject rather than the consumer, still the aim of both 
data protection and consumer protection rules are the same, namely to protect the weak. 
Furthermore, one of the most contemporary issues regarding data protection in Europe is 
the consumer privacy, which rendered designation of a person as a consumer of critical 
importance. Withal, the following discussion concerns neither the data protection, nor ju-
risdiction complications in mobile applications. On this wise, this paper examines the lia-
bility issues in mobile application contracts with relation to the European consumer acquis.  
1.4.  Outline of the main part 
The debate of following chapters regarding above cited matters will be preceded by chapter 
2.1., which will give a basic explanation of mobile application relationship in addition to 
parties and contracts thereof.  
Subsequently, chapter 2.2. will discuss the relevant interests in the mobile application rela-
tionship in, with a specific focus to consumers’ interests in protection against unfair terms. 
Chapter 2.3. will assess whether mobile application developers can be classified as a “con-
sumer” in European consumer acquis.  
Following in chapter 2.4., the liability issues in mobile application relationships will be 
analysed, classifying them in two sub-chapters; chapters 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, depending on 
whether developers’ stances as consumers. Whereas, the sub-sections of chapters 2.4.1 and 
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2.4.2 will assess the liability situations particularly to each contract governing the relation-
ships between parties of mobile application dealings, namely the distribution, end-user li-
cense and terms of service agreements. Mentioned assessment will hinge on the conse-
quences of the Unfair Terms Directive regarding distributors’ liability from the losses aris-
ing from their own actions in addition to the applicability of a favourable treatment with 
regards to developer who cannot be classified as consumers. 
2. Liability Issues in Mobile Application Relationships 
 
This chapter will assess the liability situation in mobile application relationships, particu-
larly focusing on the accountability of mobile application distributors from the damages 
caused by their actions. On this wise, the subsequent chapter will give a general overview 
to the current situation in the mentioned relationship. In the following chapter, relevant 
interests concerning the allotment of responsibility in mobile application relationships will 
be stated. Finally, chapter 2.4. will discuss the allotment of liability with regards to devel-
opers situation as a consumer according to European law. 
2.1. Mobile application contracts and legal situation of the parties of 
mobile application relationships 
Mobile application programs are software that processes data24 in order to perform a group 
of coordinated functions, tasks and activities for the end-user. Mobile applications can be 
categorised under native, mobile web, hybrid applications with regards to their platform 
types25. Native apps are specific to a given operating system, such as IOS or Android26. 
Mobile web applications, on the other hand, are device neutral and can rather be defined as 
mobile versions of web pages, accessed only through web-browsers27. Hybrid applications, 
which constitute a significant majority, consist of primary content coded in a Web language 
                                                
 
24 Pcmag.com (2015) 
25 Clutch.co (2015)  
26 ibid.  
27 ibid. 
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which can access some device functionality28. Unlike mobile web applications, some of the  
native applications and most of the hybrid ones can be purchased or downloaded through 
mobile distribution platforms. Some distribution platforms are native to the major mobile 
operating systems, whereas others are third-party platforms that are alternative to the for-
mer type.  
Mobile applications are typically not developed by the distributors themselves but rather 
placed on the market by virtue of the mobile application software development contracts. 
Parties to the said are mobile application software developer and the mobile application 
distributor.  
The mobile software platforms are frequently termed as “distributors”. Indeed, similarly to 
Amazon29, Google Play describes its services as “distribution”30 in the Google Play Devel-
opment Distribution Agreement31. Nevertheless, classifying a contract between mobile ap-
plication platforms and mobile application software developers as a distribution agreement 
is not in compliance with the main features of a distribution relationship.  
In a distribution relationship, the supplier receives a payment from the distributor in ex-
change to the products subject to the agreement32. By this virtue, the distributor gains own-
ership rights to the products, thusly becoming entitled to sell them in its own behalf. The 
mobile app development contracts, however, envisage no payment duty for the distributor. 
Moreover, the majority of the distributors, such as Google Play, retain from acquiring any 
rights or titles33 from the developer. In other words, unlike distributors in distribution con-
tracts, the mobile app distributors do not resell the apps marketed in their platform since 
they do not buy them from the app developers primarily.  
                                                
 
28 Clutch.co (2015) 
29 Amazon App Distribution and Services Agreement Distribution Schedule art. 3 (a) 
30 Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement art. 1.1, 2.1 and 5.2 
31 Turke (2014) 
32 Martin (2015) 
33 Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement art. 4.1 
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As is emphasized by Apple’s IOS Developer Program License Agreement34, the mobile 
app development contracts rather resemble agency contracts. An agency relationship arises 
where the agent has the express or implied consent to act on behalf of the principal, in ef-
fecting legal relations with third parties35. Black’s Law Dictionary defines agency as “every 
relation in which one person acts for or represents another by latter's authority”36. Indeed, 
by virtue of the distribution agreements, developers authorize distributors to market the 
apps on their behalf, creating a fiduciary relationship.  
On the other hand, the mobile app development dealings are commonly devoid of distinc-
tive features of agency relationships. In agency, agents agree to act under the direction37 or 
control38 of principals. Mobile application distribution contracts, however, do not foresee 
any obligations for distributors to act as directed by developers. On the contrary, the major-
ity of the mobile app development contracts entitle the distributors to market the mobile 
app under distributors’ sole discretion. For instance, in addition to limiting the usage of any 
APIs39 that are not documented by Apple40, Apple obliges IOS developers to use Apple’s 
developing software41. Furthermore, coupled with its ban on marketing the mobile app in 
other app stores42, Apple’s reservation of its right to determine, on its sole discretion, 
whether the mobile app will be placed on App Market43 signifies that Apple makes the final 
decision about marketing the mobile app, not its developer. Similarly, Amazon secures its 
right to determine whether to distribute the mobile app on its sole discretion44. Likewise, 
Google too maintains a significant control over the apps Google Play distributes45. Google 
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decides how to display the mobile apps46, reserves its right to remove the app from the 
store47 and even from the end-user devices48. As seen, contrarily to the nature of agency 
contracts, mobile app distributors are far from acting under the direction or control of de-
velopers, on the contrary it is usually the developers who act under the control of the dis-
tributors.  
Even though it is not expressly named in the development contracts as such, the mobile 
application distributors can preferably be referred to as electronic commerce (e-commerce) 
intermediaries49. Internet intermediaries are intermediaries bringing together or facilitating 
transactions between third parties, occasionally aggregating supply and demand50 in elec-
tronic markets51. E-commerce intermediaries are internet intermediary platforms that do not 
take title to the goods being sold52. Accordingly, a distributor, as an e-commerce interme-
diary, connects end-users, buyers, and developers, suppliers, to enable a transaction be-
tween them53, namely the purchase of an application, in distribution platforms, in other 
words application stores. 
Rather than intermediaries like wholesalers, cooperatives, travel and insurance agencies54, 
mobile app distributors stand closer to virtual marketplaces55, such as internet retailers and 
auction platforms that sell third party products to its customers. Similarly to the latter, the 
distributors provide both information and matching services by making it known that a giv-
en app is on sale, identifying preferences of the end-users via categorical placement and 
providing means for the end-user to assess the quality and technological characteristics of 
an application, reputation of the developer56. Nevertheless, since it is mobile application 
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distributors determining whether to market an application or not, they are in better control 
of the products they market than a typical auction platform. As will be explained, said fact 
renders liability claims against mobile app distributors more powerful. 
Together with their services regarding marketing of the mobile applications and providing 
access to them, distributors also provide cloud computing services. Cloud computing is an 
arrangement, whereby computing resources are provided on a flexible basis that allows for 
rapid and seamless allocation on demand57 that enables the service receiver to obtain appli-
cations from any location via Internet58 . On this wise, distributors provide a cloud service 
in both platform as a service (PaaS) and software as a service (SaaS) levels to developers, 
while the cloud service they provide to end-users are solely in SaaS level.  
PaaS level cloud service providers provide platforms for developing and deploying soft-
ware applications59, which is exactly what distributors supply to developers.  
The SaaS level cloud service providers, on the other hand, supply the software and storage 
for data thereof. Distributors enable end-users and developers to access mobile applications 
regardless of the location, on this wise they host the mobile applications on their cloud 
spaces. In this respect, in Schedule 1 of IOS Developer Program License Agreement, Apple 
stresses the fact that it provides hosting services to developers and end-users60 in addition 
to permitting developers to use its cloud services for the purpose of storage and retrieval of 
key value data61, other documentation and end-user data storage62. 
When a mobile application is purchased through a distribution platform by an end-user, 
there is a trihedral contractual relationship lying under to govern the law of the purchase. 
The relationship between end-users and developers are governed by end-user license 
agreements. On the other hand, dealings between mobile application distributors and de-
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velopers are determined by virtue of agreements regulating the manner in which distribu-
tors are to provide their services in addition to the requirements developers and their appli-
cations should satisfy to be served so. Apple names the agreement it utilizes to regulate the 
mentioned relationship as Developer Program Licensing Agreement whereas Google clas-
sifies the same as a Developer Distribution Agreement. Amazon, on the other hand utilizes 
the term App Distribution and Services Agreement. Despite the said variation this paper 
refers to the said type of contracts as distribution agreements. Meanwhile, mobile applica-
tion end-users’ utilization of the distributors’ services is subject to the terms and service 
agreements provided by the distribution platforms.  
All three types of contracts listed above, are provided in standard term contracts, to which 
developers or end-users agree to by a click-wrap format. Since these contracts are provided 
by distributors and developers, said implies that the liability clauses therein reflects the 
interests of the provider of the services or goods in question. 
The majority of the distribution contracts make use of an indemnification63 clause, a dis-
claimer of warranty64 and a limitation of liability65 clause in order to minimize the risk of 
accountability.  
On this wise, the indemnification clause in 11th article of Apple’s IOS developer Program 
License Agreement states; 
“To the extent permitted by applicable law, You agree to indemnify and hold harm-
less, and upon Apple’s request, defend, Apple, its directors, officers, employees, in-
dependent contractors and agents (each an "Apple Indemnified Party") from any and 
all claims, losses, liabilities, damages, taxes, expenses and costs, including without 
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limitation, attorneys’ fees and court costs (collectively, "Losses"), incurred by an Ap-
ple Indemnified Party and arising from or related to any of the following…” 
Accordingly, the same agreement asserts;  
“Apple shall have no responsibility for the installation and/or use of any of the Li-
censed Applications by any end-user. You shall be solely responsible for any and all 
product warranties, end- user assistance and product support with respect to each of 
the Licensed Applications.” 66 
“You shall be solely responsible for, and Apple shall have no responsibility or liabil-
ity whatsoever with respect to, any and all claims, suits, liabilities, losses, damages, 
costs and expenses arising from, or attributable to, the Licensed Applications and/or 
the use of those Licensed Applications by any end-user, including, but not limited 
to…” 67 
Additionally, Apple impels68 developers to incorporate following terms in their EULAs; 
“You and the end-user must acknowledge that the EULA is concluded between You 
and the end-user only, and not with Apple, and You, not Apple, are solely responsible 
for the Licensed Application and the content thereof. The EULA may not provide for 
usage rules for Licensed Applications that are in conflict with, the App Store Terms 
of Service as of the Effective Date (which You acknowledge You have had the oppor-
tunity to review).”69 
Moreover, Apple make use of the following terms in order to prevent any developer claims; 
“The Apple Software or services may contain inaccuracies or errors that could cause 
failures or loss of data and it may be incomplete … Apple and its licensors reserve 
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the right to change, suspend, remove, or disable access to any Services (or any part 
thereof) at any time without notice. In no event will Apple or its licensors be liable for 
the removal of or disabling of access to any such Services. Apple or its licensors may 
also impose limits on the use of or access to certain Services, or may remove the Ser-
vices for indefinite time periods or cancel the Services at any time and in any case 
and without notice or liability. You expressly acknowledge and agree that use of the 
apple software, security solution, and any services is at your sole risk and that the en-
tire risk as to satisfactory quality, performance, accuracy and effort is with you. The 
apple software, security solution, and any services are provided "as is" and "as 
available", with all faults and without warranty of any kind, and apple, apple’s 
agents and apple's licensors (collectively referred to as "apple" for the purposes of 
sections 13 and 14) hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with respect to the 
apple software, security solution, and services, either express, implied or statutory, 
including without limitation the implied warranties and conditions of merchantabil-
ity, satisfactory quality, fitness for a particular purpose, accuracy, timeliness, and 
non-infringement of third party rights. … Should the apple software, security solu-
tion, or services prove defective, you assume the entire cost of all necessary servic-
ing, repair or correction. Location data as well as any maps data provided by any 
Services or software is for basic navigational purposes only and is not intended to be 
relied upon in situations where precise location information is needed or where erro-
neous, inaccurate or incomplete location data may lead to death, personal injury, 
property or environmental damage. Neither Apple nor any of its licensors guarantees 
the availability, accuracy, completeness, reliability, or timeliness of location data or 
any other data or information displayed by any Services or software.”70 
“To the extent not prohibited by applicable law, in no event will apple be liable for 
personal injury, or any incidental, special, indirect, consequential or punitive dam-
ages whatsoever, including, without limitation, damages for loss of profits, loss of da-
                                                
 
70 IOS Developer Program License Agreement art.13 
 19 
ta, business interruption or any other commercial damages or losses, arising out of 
or related to this agreement, your use or inability to use the apple software, security 
solution or services, digital certificates, or your development efforts or participation 
in the program, however caused, whether under a theory of contract, warranty, tort 
(including negligence), products liability, or otherwise, even if apple has been ad-
vised of the possibility of such damages, and notwithstanding the failure of essential 
purpose of any remedy. In no event shall Apple’s total liability to You under this 
Agreement for all damages (other than as may be required by applicable law in cases 
involving personal injury) exceed the amount of fifty dollars ($50.00).”71 
By this virtue, the distributors attempt to ensure that developers bear the sole responsibility 
regarding any loss or damage that result from the mobile application in question72. The 
extended indemnification clauses burden developers with holding distributors unaccounta-
ble for any possible claim. Developers, meanwhile, are not granted any such easement of 
liability73. 
Furthermore, disclaimer of warranty clauses denote “as is” and “as available” principles of 
the distribution services74. Mentioned principles imply that the distributors do not guaran-
tee any aspect of the service or goods provided, together with denying any responsibility in 
the event of failure to provide such services.  
As for the limitation of liability clauses, the general tendency of development agreements is 
to deny all liability of any kind75. Additionally, some distributors, such as Apple, set a 
monetary cap to their liability, $50 USD in Apple’s case76, for all damages in any event. 
Validity of said caps according to European law, along with the effectiveness of the listed 
clauses, will be discussed hereafter. 
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Moreover, by virtue of development agreements, distributors maintain a significant control 
over the mobile applications’ both before77 and after their purchase78. On this wise, distrib-
utors reserve their rights to remove and prevent access to mobile applications and deny any 
liability considering damages this action would cause.  
Regarding the relationship between distributors and end-users, the terms of service agree-
ments, thereupon, typically attempt to render distributors immune from any responsibility 
by firstly, transferring the liability to developers and secondly, placing limitation of liabil-
ity clauses. Accordingly, said contracts stress that EULAs are to govern solely application 
purchases, parties of which are developers and end-users79. By this way, distributor plat-
forms place themselves out of the application purchase relationship, thusly being exempted 
from any liability that may incur by the parties.  
However, Apple allocates itself as the third party beneficiary of EULAs and reserves its 
right to enforce the EULA80. Assessed together with its disclaimer of warranty clauses, the 
mentioned suggests that Apple accepts only the benefits of but no responsibilities from 
EULAs. The imbalance, created by the said situation and its consequences will be dis-
cussed by the successive chapters.  
As to the licensing relationship between developer and end-user, developers utilize EULAs 
to regulate the purchase of a mobile application and the relationship thereof. Mobile appli-
cations are proprietary software that is subject to copyright protection. Being the author 
thereof, the developer of a mobile application has the exclusive proprietary right to repro-
duce, communicate to public and distribute the software81. On this wise, the developer of 
the mobile application executes his right to distribution of the copyrighted software by vir-
tue of licensing agreements, in other words the EULAs. Correspondingly, EULAs regulate 
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the rights and obligations of the licensee, the end-user, and the licensor, the developer. In 
most distributors’ cases, such as Apple and Amazon, distributors provide a standard/default 
EULA by their development agreements82 or terms of services83. By their development 
agreements, both Apple84 and Amazon85 compel developers to adopt EULAs that are con-
sistent with the standard/default EULA provided. Said obligation displays distributors’ 
dominating power over the mobile application relationship since they claim to have the 
authority to designate the terms of an agreement they are not a party of. Mentioned supply 
of default EULA sets the minimum EULA terms for developers while informing end-users 
about minimum licensing terms. Additionally default EULAs generally include terms em-
phasizing that distributor is in no event liable or responsible from any aspect of the mobile 
application and their purchases86. 
2.2. Policy considerations 
Frederick Schiller denoted the objective of law in a memorable quote, namely as “Law is 
the protector of the weak.”. On this wise, despite regulating dealings of the equals, contract 
law as well sets some mandatory rules, ratio legis of which is to help and protect the weak-
er party87. 
Consumer law is one of the areas that is densely regulated by the mandatory rules protect-
ing the weak party. This is due to the substantial imbalance between parties88 of consumer 
contracts. Consumers tend to be less informed in legal matters in addition to having less 
bargaining power89. In other words, as a consequence of limited information and time, con-
sumers lack sophistication90, leading to their weaker position against professionals. Follow-
                                                
 
82 IOS Developer Program License Agreement Exhibit B 
83 Amazon App Store for Android Terms of Use art.3.3 
84 IOS Developer Program License Agreement  Schedule 1 art. 2.1, 3.2 
85 Amazon App Distribution and Services Agreement Distribution Schedule art.4(a) 
86 IOS Developer Program License Agreement  Schedule 1, Exhibit B art.5, 6;  Amazon App Store for An-
droid Terms of Use art.3.3(vii) 
87 Schoenmakers (2014) p.3 
88 Schoenmakers (2014) p.3 
89 1975 Council Resolution on consumer protection Annex I.A. 
90 DiMatteo (2012) p.223 
 22 
ing the same rationale, the directives91 and policy papers92 of the European Commission 
had set the protection of consumer as the foundation of the European consumer law. 
With the escalation of smart phone technologies, mobile applications become more perti-
nent to the everyday lives of the people. In due course, as the mobile applications started to 
be used more frequently, private people and businesses started to depend more on mobile 
applications. Said dependence increased the revenues, of distributors, drawn from mobile 
application purchases, regarding paid applications, and advertisement services, regarding 
free applications.  
With respect to the mentioned benefits enjoyed by distributors, typically, they would be 
expected to undertake responsibility from the satisfaction of end-users from the goods pur-
chased, namely the mobile applications. Contradictorily, apart from accepting being held 
responsible for the quality of mobile applications, the distributors, even, deny any liability 
even from their own actions during the services they offer. On this wise, distributors make 
use of the distribution agreements between them and the developers, as well as the terms of 
service agreement governing their relationships with the end-users, to prevent any lawful 
claims against themselves, and usually direct all of them to the developers. 
Some smartphone system software does not accept applications purchased through other 
distributor platforms to run on their systems. Besides, the majority of the distributors pro-
vide their services under practically similar terms. Therefore, an end-user or a developer 
has no practical choice regarding the liability clauses he/she is served with. When groups of 
people with weaknesses regarding legal or technological knowledge and bargaining power 
are concerned, it becomes clear that such people should be favoured against mentioned 
unfair situations, to which they are forced to agree via terms of contracts they, in most cas-
es, do not even read before accepting. Accordingly, the expedient situation distributors en-
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joy by virtue of standard contractual terms freeing them from any liability should, in some 
cases, be limited by mandatory rules designated to protect the weak.  
As the following chapters will demonstrate, a possible designation of developers or end-
users as consumers would render European consumer acquis applicable to the mobile ap-
plication relationship at hand. The above cited limitations to distributors’ advantageous 
situation would, by this virtue, be regulated by the mandatory rules of the consumer law. 
However, in some instances, non-consumer end-users and developers can, as well, be in a 
weaker position. In this context, this paper also examines the extent to which aforemen-
tioned limitations would be valid to hold the distributor at the least liable from their own 
actions in addition to the liability situations where the mandatory rules would not be appli-
cable.  
Truly, even if the European consumer acquis does not categorize them as consumers93, 
small and medium enterprise developers or end-users, usually undergo similar deficiencies 
regarding legal knowledge and bargaining power. Subsequent chapters will discuss whether 
small and medium enterprise developers can be protected against the large enterprise dis-
tributors since the nature of the ratio legis of the consumer protection, namely protecting 
the weak, essentially, does not validate such a discrimination against them just because 
they are not natural persons. 
An end-user of the mobile application relationship is usually the party that does not have 
comprehensive information about the nature or the value of the commodity traded94, name-
ly the mobile application. Typically, an end-user would have no effect whatsoever on the 
terms and conditions of the service it receives from the mobile application distributor, no 
more on the End-User License Agreement between him/her, as the licensee, and the devel-
oper, as the licensor. 
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Likewise, mobile application developers, too, commonly stand on the weaker end of the 
contractual relationship. Unlike an end-user however, being the creator of the technology, 
the developers are ordinarily informed of the nature of the commodities traded. On the oth-
er hand, most mobile developers have no more legal knowledge or bargaining power, re-
garding the consequences of the terms they are served by the distributor, than an end-user. 
Compared to an average developer, mobile application distributors provide a better guaran-
tee for the end-users in the case of damages caused by mobile applications distributed 
through the distributors’ platform. 
Firstly, due to regulations on the subject, most of the mobile software distributors have a 
representative branch in the territory of European Union. For that reason, jurisdiction wise, 
it is easier for the damaged end-user to start a litigation process against the distributor com-
pared to a developer, which can be any natural or legal person in any place in the world. 
Hence, an ability to hold the distributor liable in some damages can free the end-user from 
a significant burden of litigation costs. 
Secondly, with estimated worldwide revenue of $ 45.37 billion U.S. dollars95 in 2015, there 
is no doubt about the economical magnitude of the mobile application market. As the big-
gest actor of the mobile software industry, distributors enjoy increasing amount of revenues 
each year. In Apple App Store’s case, the distributor saw revenue of $ 3 billion US dollars 
in 201396, which has escalated to $ 4.5 billion US dollars in 201497.  On the other hand, the 
majority of mobile application developers do not generate such high levels of income. 
Thus, unlike distributors, a developer may not have the sufficient means for compensating 
a rightful claim of loss. In some situations, a damaged end-user may not be able to com-
pensate his/her loss from the developer, in spite of having the right to claim it. For this rea-
son, in order to guarantee them an indemnification, it seems beneficial for consumer end-
users to place some of the liability on the distributors. 
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Furthermore, not all developers are professionals seeking a high income from the mobile 
application they create. Some developers are natural persons that are interested in creating 
and able to create mobile applications, who merely want to share their creation with the 
society. If applied strictly, the liability clauses of typical mobile software contracts would 
create a significant legal and economic risk for developers who are not aiming economical 
gain. Said may discourage them from creating and sharing the software, which, for the sake 
of innovation, would clearly not be desired.  
As matters stand, in typical mobile software dealings, a preferential treatment to end-users 
and developers against the distributors, would be in accordance with general disposition of 
consumer law, namely protection of the weak. In the matter of liability, said preferential 
treatment shows itself as holding the extended disclaimers of liability of mobile distribution 
contracts unenforceable.  
2.3. Notion of “consumer” 
The fundamental rationale for all contract laws is the private autonomy, namely the free-
dom to conclude contracts and determine its contents98. Such freedom is also the basis to 
the European law99. Nonetheless, in response to inequality in bargaining power and lack of 
knowledge in consumer contracts, European consumer law regulates some mandatory rules 
as an exception to the said principle. 
Particularly with the Unfair Terms Directive, the European consumer law attempts to ame-
liorate the disproportion of contractual power between large enterprises and consumers by 
invalidating standard terms in consumer contracts that cause consumers significant disad-
vantage100.  
As presented by the preceding chapter, mobile app distributors have preponderant roles 
over developers and end-users. Accordingly, the issue of liability arising from mobile ap-
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plications, too, has been regulated by and in favour of distributors. In some cases, said situ-
ation causes an imbalance between the parties, to the disadvantage of either the end-user or 
the developer. Therefore, in Europe, the explained imbalance between rights and obliga-
tions101 of developers and end-users in liability clauses of mobile application contracts can 
bring about their rescission by virtue of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
However, as the Unfair Terms Directive is germane to consumer contracts, for the Di-
rective to be applicable, the party contracting with the distributor must be a consumer.  On 
this wise, designating the party contracting with the distributor in a mobile application con-
tract as consumer may cultivate to a result that have been meticulously avoided by app 
stores, namely the shifting of liability on them in certain cases. 
2.3.1.  Notion of “consumer” in European consumer acquis 
The definition of consumer designates to whom the protection is entitled to. In mobile ap-
plication developers’ case that corresponds to what extend developers and end-users would 
be protected against distributors’ abuse of their power in the app development relationship.  
The notion of consumer in consumer acquis of European law constitutes a mottled102 pic-
ture as a result of diverse wordings in various directives103. The notions of consumer and 
professional are defined in several directives104, be it current or abolished, in a manner that 
serves only the scope of the directives in question105. Nevertheless a majority of current 
European directives106 agree in defining the consumer as a natural person who, in transac-
tions covered by the directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business 
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or profession107. From this definition two central characteristics108 of an European consum-
er can be deduced;  
• being a natural person, and 
• acting for purposes which are outside some kind of business, commercial or trade 
activity109 
As will briefly be explained hereafter, said characteristics result in the exclusion of busi-
nesses concluding atypical contracts, semi and medium enterprises, charitable and religious 
organisations from the ambit of protection, while creating some uncertainties about the dual 
purpose dealings110.  
Both Consumer Protection and Unfair Terms Directives define consumer as a “natural” 
person111. Unlike the Unfair Terms Directive, which envisages a minimum harmonisation, 
Consumer Protection Directive requires full harmonisation112. Nonetheless, with its recital 
13, the Consumer Protection Directive expressly allows the Member States to extend the 
application of the  Directive to legal persons or natural persons not covered by the Di-
rective113. Similarly, Member States are entitled to extend the scope of unfair terms protec-
tion as The Unfair Terms Directive adopts minimum harmonisation114.  
Correspondingly, ECJ jurisprudence, too, has interpreted the notion of consumer to be 
strictly limited to natural persons115. 
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When dealing with large companies, legal persons like small and medium size enterprises, 
charitable and religious organisations may not possess stronger bargaining powers or in-
formation on legal matters than natural persons116. Likewise, in some situations, legal per-
sons not acting in pursuit of their situations might have a weaker position and thusly need 
protection117. Hence, when the aim of consumer protection is concerned, there seems to be 
no reason to exclude the mentioned legal persons from the scope of protection. However, 
the strict limitation of consumer definition to natural persons denies such vulnerable parties 
protection118 that is initially aimed to favour the weak.  
On this wise, as is stressed by the Greek academics, a teleological interpretation119 of con-
sumer definition would lead to an application that is more compatible with the aim of the 
regulations. 
In like manner, the second characteristic, which requires the natural person to be acting 
outside professional purposes, generates several complications in practice. The Unfair 
Terms Directive demands the natural person to be acting for purposes outside trade, busi-
ness and profession in order to be included into its scope of protection. The Consumer 
Rights Directive adds “craft” to the said excluded purposes. The rationale behind the said 
requirement can be seen as preventing merchants from using technical requirements of 
consumer law to avoid fulfilling their duties by invalidating B2B contracts120. The negative 
wording lets borderline situations, such as individuals purchasing goods in their own names 
but for a charity, to be included in the consumer definition121. Nevertheless, in the case of 
hybrid consumers and dual-purpose transactions the notion of consumer in European con-
sumer acquis proves to be ambiguous.  
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As a result of the widespread use of online platforms like eBay, the categorization of hy-
brid consumers122 became crucial. The definition of consumer covers the cases where con-
sumers make financial profit123 however precludes purchases purpose of which is to imme-
diately resell the goods where several such transactions are carried out in relatively short 
period of time124. Online intermediaries enable people who simply use the Internet to offer 
some unwanted items for sale as well as people who buy goods with a view of reselling 
them125. In the latter situation, the purpose of the transaction may be designated as being 
inside the trade or business of the seller but the fine line, setting hybrid consumers apart 
from professionals, is not always clear, hence requiring a case by case investigation. Thus-
ly, a clarification by European law makers of the notion of “trade, business, craft and pro-
fession” in accordance with the online environments seems to be needed. 
Another particularly controversial area is mixed or dual-purpose transactions, concluded 
for both personal and professional purposes126. The 17th Recital of the Consumer Protection 
Directive designates dual-purpose contracts as being in the scope of the protection of the 
Directive when the professional purpose is not predominant127. While some writers criticize 
the Directive’s regulation of dual-purpose transactions by recitals rather than by consumer 
definition128, there is no doubt that the reference to the said primary purpose principle con-
tributes to the clarification of the ambiguity on the subject129. The Unfair Terms Directive 
has no remark regarding dual-purpose transactions, but the general view of European 
scholars’ supports said approach as the reasons for protecting consumers prevails where the 
consumer is not acting to a great extent within professional sphere130. 
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ECJ jurisprudence, having rendered slightest professional purpose a reason to exclude the 
person from consumer definition in Gruber case131, tends to interpret the notion of "purpos-
es outside trade, business and profession" narrowly132. However, since said jurisprudence 
concerned solely the procedural law, validity of aforementioned interpretation in substan-
tive law is questionable133. Additionally, as the Consumer Protection Directive has recently 
entered into force134 the affect of its 17th Recital on ECJ's interpretation of mixed purpose 
transactions is yet to be seen. 
Another issue prevailing especially in e-commerce transactions case is to what extend con-
sumers should identify themselves135. In a German case, dealing with a consumer who act-
ed like an enterprise, the German Supreme Court decided that, in such situations, the con-
sumer cannot be protected according to consumer acquis136.  Notwithstanding, it is not 
clearly worded in European instruments whether the professionals dealing with consumers 
should be subjectively aware of the consumers’ situations. Having said that, European con-
sumer acquis requires solely the presence of a consumer contract, rather than any subjec-
tive knowledge of the fact. Therefore, it would be safe to say that, within the borders of 
good will and fair dealing, the presence of a consumer as a party, according to objective 
criteria137, is enough for the consumer law to be applicable to a transaction.   
2.3.2. Mobile application developers’ stance as consumer  
Mobile app development agreements do not designate the identity of the developer. In oth-
er words, any individual or legal person can be a developer, independently from the pur-
pose, be it business or private. The consequence of a developer’s being consumer is that, it 
designates whether the development contract can be classified as a consumer transaction or 
not. As is explained before, only in the case of consumer transactions, mandatory rules of 
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consumer acquis can be applied to contracts in order to favour the consumer. The direct 
implications of said notion on mobile application development relationship, exclusively on 
liability issues, will be discussed in the following chapters. 
It seems to be accurate to classify developers in four groups in order to examine their 
stance as consumers in development contracts. To this extend, the first category to be ex-
amined is natural person developers who act for private purposes, or rather purposes out-
side business, trade or profession. Since any person who has adequate skills can create a 
mobile application to use in his/her everyday life, such developers have recently become 
rather easy to come by. 
Assuming that such developers do not designate a price for the app, in other words offer the 
app free of charge, they would certainly be compatible with consumer definition of Euro-
pean consumer acquis.  
On this point, the Consumer Protection Directive’s consumer definition, which excludes 
purposes within one’s craft may seem to be suggesting a rather dubious nature. Neverthe-
less considering the term “craft” to include past time activities and hobbies would constrict 
the scope of consumer protection to the point of nonexistence. Thus, it would be pertinent 
to regard the developer acting for private purposes to be operating outside craft purposes as 
well. 
In the case where the developers in this category designate a price for the app, they should 
still be considered as consumers since, as is mentioned above, mere incidental profit do not 
hinder the natural person from being a consumer. In fact, the purposes of such a developer 
are more clearly out of profession, trade or business in this case than a consumer selling 
one unwanted item in eBay, who is commonly regarded as a consumer. 
By virtue of the rapid innovation of internet technology, mostly in the sphere of digital 
commerce, traditional consumers increasingly morphed into producers of their own prod-
 32 
ucts or services using semi-professional equipment138. This brought about the expansion of 
the term “prosumer”139 , a fusion of the words consumer and producer or professional, in 
online environment140. The situation is similar in mobile application practices as any person 
who has relevant knowledge about the usage of application development kits (ADKs) 
would be able to develop and market an app via one of the many distributing platforms. On 
this wise, natural person developers who occasionally develop mobile apps for monetary 
purposes, could be categorized as a prosumers. The question of whether prosumers can 
benefit from the privileges granted to consumers can only be answered by a close examina-
tion of the term profession, trade or business. Many European Member States141, take 
“profit-organisation-frequency” criteria as the benchmark to designates whether a party can 
be classified as professional or not. Nevertheless, as these criteria is not expected to be met 
cumulatively142, prosumer developers, who would be meeting at least the profit criterion, 
namely the intention to make economical gain, constitute professionals within the meaning 
of European consumer acquis. 
Another problematic situation herein is the stance of natural person developers who act in 
dual purposes. Any tech savvy person can develop an app to organise his/her daily life, 
which would include his/her work appointments alongside private ones. As explained 
above, European consumer acquis, recognises the possibility of mixed purpose transactions 
to be classified as consumer contracts. Thusly, in some cases natural persons developing 
partly with professional aims could as well be categorized as consumers. 
A second category would be natural person developers who are regularly developing mo-
bile apps and relevant software to market them in order to make financial profit. Pursuant 
to the second characteristic of consumer definition, such developers would be considered 
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outside the notion of consumer as they would be regarded operating within business pur-
poses.  
As for the legal person developers, the dubious nature of applicability of the consumer no-
tion does not lie within those who act in the ambit of their profession, but rather in legal 
person developers, whose profession, trade or business has no link with developing appli-
cations.  
With Idealservice case143, ECJ stated clearly that only natural persons could be consumers 
in relation to Unfair Terms Directive. The Court demonstrated same approach in Oceano 
case. Concerning the mentioned case the Court rendered the protection of the Directive to 
be applicable to only a specific category of persons, on the grounds that it is an exception 
to the principle of contractual freedom. The Court went on to explain that, legal persons 
and companies are not seen as weaker parties as they are economically strong, adequately 
experienced in legal matters, powerful and better organised144. 
However, when applied to  mobile application distribution relationships, said proposition of 
ECJ may overestimate some categories of developers. Majority of the charitable organisa-
tions, today, make usage of mobile applications for various reasons. Most of these organi-
sations, who are legal persons, do not operate on profit purposes, do not have an organisa-
tion regarding mobile app development and do not develop apps frequently. For that cause, 
dislodging them from the ambit of the protection granted to weaker parties would be unfair, 
given the fact that they experience same disadvantages with other persons, accepted to be 
consumers. Indeed, in the UK145, some legal person developers in mentioned situations are 
entitled to protection against unfair contract terms, by virtue of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act. 
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As matters stand, according to European consumer acquis, especially the Unfair Terms and 
Consumer Protection Directives, some mobile application developers can be classified as 
consumers in their dealings with distribution platforms.  As will be explained hereafter, 
said stance of developers’ affects not only their contractual relationship with distributors; 
but the whole mobile application relationship.  
2.4. Liability issues in mobile application contracts 
This chapter examines the allotment of liability in situations where the developer cannot be 
deemed culpable for a damage, caused by an aspect of his mobile application , which had 
incurred by the end-user or the developer himself.   
As explained before, by virtue of their decisive power over the contracts of mobile applica-
tion dealings, distributors enjoy a dominant situation over the relationship thereof.  
For instance, Apple's IOS Developer Program Licence Agreement requires developers to 
submit their applications and relevant updates, including security bugs, to a test, result of 
which determines whether or not the software will be published and therefore marketed in 
App Store146. The said, concurrently, grants Apple the right to reject developers’ request 
for distribution of their software “for any reason”147. Similarly, by virtue of its App Distri-
bution and Services Agreement, Amazon denies any obligation to distribute an applica-
tion148. Likewise, Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement maintains Google’s right 
to display the application and change their placement in the platform at its sole discre-
tion149. Additionally, distributors usually reserve their rights to block, disable and remove 
any application from their platforms at their sole discretions150, refraining from any obliga-
tion of prior notice and liability thereof. 
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Accordingly, when a developer develops an update, such as a security bug, to his mobile 
application and submits it to Apple for approval151, he loses the control over the situation. 
From the said point on, Apple has the sole discretion to determine when and if the update 
will be published. During the time interval between the submission of a security update and 
approval of it by Apple, end-user security rests in Apples hand152. On this wise, presuming 
the lack of the aforementioned update caused damage to an end-user in the time period be-
tween the developers submission and distributors approval, it would be unjust to denounce 
the developer faulty. 
Moreover, constituting an information society service provider within the meaning of Elec-
tronic Commerce Directive, mobile application distributors are subject to Directive’s safe 
harbour rules. Pursuant to aforementioned, to avoid liability, distributors have to expedi-
tiously remove any unlawful third party content hosted by them, namely the mobile appli-
cations, upon acquisition knowledge thereof153. Despite its wide field of implementation, 
Electronic Commerce Directive provides no clarification to what constitutes gaining of 
knowledge154 or expeditiousness155. In other words, since the directive does not establish a 
notice and take down regime156,  distributors, like other information service providers, have 
no legal security with regards to when they can be rendered liable. The mentioned obligates 
the service providers to respond even the most implausible notices of infringement with 
removal. In such manner, a mobile app distributor, too, would respond to a notice of in-
fringement about a mobile application with displacement of it from the store. The question 
of liability in such cases rise when the mobile application is indeed not unlawful and an 
end-user suffers damage because of the removal, since holding the developer responsible, 
in this instance, would be inequitable. 
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Contrarily to the authority bestowed upon, with corresponding indemnification and dis-
claimer of warranty clauses, mobile application contracts liberate the distributors from any 
liability including for the damages caused by their own actions, while burdening the devel-
opers with responsibility thereof. The imbalance between interests of the parties, thereof, is 
apparent insomuch that, in cases similar to above illustrated, it can be deemed as being un-
fair.  
Nonetheless, since the principle of contractual freedom dictates that parties are free to de-
termine the contents of a contract157, even such unfairness would be permitted when parties 
agree thereto. However, the consumer law regulates exceptions to the said principle via its 
mandatory rules aiming to protect consumers. Here, the applicability of consumer regula-
tions to a contract suggests a critical role with regards to enforceability of unfair clauses. 
On this wise, as the European consumer acquis requires presence of a consumer contract, 
specification of one contractual party as a consumer becomes critical in the case of mobile 
application distributors providing services in the territory of the European Union. 
Thusly, following subsections will analyse the variability of effectiveness of mobile appli-
cation contracts' liability clauses, in other words accountability of distributors, with regards 
to European consumer acquis’ applicability to the contracts at hand, namely whether a de-
veloper can be classified as a consumer or not .  
2.4.1 When the developer is a consumer 
As explained in the previous chapter, according to European consumer acquis, in cases 
where he is a natural person acting outside professional purposes the mobile application 
developer can be identified as a consumer. In addition to having particularly visible affects 
on the distribution agreement, such an identification changes the liability situation in the 
whole mobile application relationship. 
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Firstly, classifying the developer as a consumer would render the distribution contract a 
B2C agreement, namely a consumer contract. In such wise, the distribution contract enter 
in the scope of European consumer acquis, and therefore, the Unfair Terms Directive. 
Furthermore, the designation of a developer as a consumer changes the forcefulness  issues 
of EULAs they utilize against consumer end-users in Europe. After all, said would render 
the EULA a C2C agreement, which would discard them from the scope of Unfair Terms 
Directive. In other words, in such instances, the end-users would be bound by EULA terms 
as protection of European consumer acquis does not apply to agreements that are not con-
sumer contracts. 
In such manner, subsections of this chapter will examine the liability situations regarding 
three mobile application contracts’, namely the contracts between developers, distributors 
and end-users, developers of which can be classified as consumers. 
2.4.1.1. Liability in mobile application distribution agreements 
contracted with consumer developers 
As is cited formerly, the liability situation in mobile application relationships between dis-
tributors and developers is regulated by virtue of disclaimer and indemnification terms de-
velopers. Thusly, only means a law system can affect the liability situation thereof would 
be the partly or wholly invalidation of mentioned terms. Along these lines, the Unfair 
Terms Directive, which regulates the invalidation of unfair terms in consumer contracts, 
would be the body of European Law that would have the most significant effect on the lia-
bility situations in a distribution agreement. On this wise, the question arises regarding the 
unfairness of the liability clauses. 
The Directive designates three cumulative criteria for a term to be unfair, ascribing only 
such terms not binding on the consumer158, which are; 
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• The term should not be individually negotiated, and 
• The term should cause significant imbalance between the parties contrary to good 
faith, and 
• The situation should be to the detriment of consumer.159 
In order to concretize the ambiguity of the terms "significant imbalance" and "good faith", 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has set several benchmarks for the 
Member State courts to take into account. Among these are, nature of the goods and ser-
vices, consequences of the national provisions that is to be implemented in the event of 
invalidation and circumstances attending the conclusion of contract160. 
Mobile application distribution contracts are typically presented to developers in the form 
of non-negotiated click-wrap agreements, provided on a take it or leave it basis161. In other 
words, parallelly to the fist criterion of the Directive, developers cannot substantively in-
fluence the content of the contract between him/her and the distributor162. 
The distribution agreements  typically contain various exclusion and indemnification claus-
es163. When interpreted together with clauses of other agreements forming the mobile ap-
plication relationship, mentioned terms burden developers with the responsibility of dis-
tributors’ actions while preventing any attribution of liability to the distributor.  
The former chapters exemplified some situations, such as the late approval of a security 
bug or the wrongful removal of the application from the platform, where the damage would 
generated by the distributors’ actions. When the terms of distribution agreements applied 
literally on the situation, it is developers who should compensate the losses incurring by the 
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end-users. Considering the mentioned situation, significance of the imbalance in the obliga-
tions of parties, created by liability terms of distribution agreements, is apparent.  
All contract law systems regulate exemptions from liability to contractual parties in the 
event of a force majeure, establishing on the idea that, no person should be held responsible 
from circumstances that cannot be controlled or prevented by him.  When an end-user 
claims the losses incurring by him from the developer, he uses his rights as governed by the 
EULA. In the event that the losses in question are indeed caused by the actions of distribu-
tor, the developer, actually, happens to be held responsible to the other party of the contract 
for damages generated by a third party. Considering the abovementioned general approach 
of contract law systems, any such obligation on the consumer developers would, evidently, 
be against the requirement of good faith, especially when the consumers are compelled to 
agree such terms by virtue of standard term agreements they “agree” through a click-wrap 
format. 
For the reasons explained, the extensive liability disclaimers and indemnification clauses of 
distribution agreements are likely to comply with the criteria set by the Unfair Terms Di-
rective , insomuch as the developers thereof are consumers. In other words such clauses are 
likely to be invalidated by mandatory rules of Member States regulated by reason of the 
Unfair Terms Directive. 
Majority of the distribution contracts make use of limitation of liability terms in order to 
avoid liability164. Apple expressly denies any liability, including personal injury, even in 
the case of negligence by Apple165. Such exclusions of liability are listed as the first of the 
seventeen items in the grey list of unfair terms annexed to the Unfair Terms Directive166.  
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A further common feature of the liability clauses in distribution agreements is the fact that 
they hold distributor unaccountable in all cases, including any sort of failure of service167 
and non-performance, regardless of their preventability. Moreover, Apple’s IOS Developer 
Program Licensing Agreement reserves Apple’s right to cease providing any sort of service 
without notice168. Terms of this kind, as well, are amongst the indicative examples to unfair 
terms in Unfair Terms Directive’s grey list. 
Withal, since the grey list of the Directive does not create a presumption about unfairness 
of a term169, designation of liability clauses' validity would require a further assessment of 
the above listed criteria while taking the principles set by CJEU into account. Accordingly, 
when above listed features of liability clauses are considered together with the nature of the 
distribution service and the forenamed apparent imbalance between parties, such clauses 
seem to be satisfying the conditions set both by the Directive and the CJEU.  
Furthermore, either via court decisions or through official documents, several Member 
States recognised similar liability disclaimer terms in various digital contracts as unfair. 
Indeed, an Italian report on the subject classified clauses aiming to limit providers’ liability 
for system dysfunctions as unfair170. Likewise Finland rendered similar warranty terms, 
excluding guaranties for quality, defects, good functioning or providing the services fit for 
the purposes of the contract,  as unfair disclaimers171.  
In France, AOL case held AOL’s term of service agreement’s disclaimer of all liability, for 
service interruptions, errors and other failures, unfair, thusly unenforceable172.  Among 
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many others, French courts also rendered AOL’s cap on liability, which is equal to six 
months of fees, unfair.173 
In a likely fashion, the guidance to UK’s Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA) stresses ser-
vice providers’ obligation to take reasonable care in any of its dealings with consumers 
while characterizing terms that could relieve the supplier from such obligations unfair174. 
The same guidance recognizes that, in order for a contract to be equally binding on both 
parties, each party should be entitled to a full compensation where the other fails to honour 
its obligations, in addition to finding clauses having an effect to the contrary open to claims 
of unfairness175. 
Evidently, according to the Unfair Terms Directive, liability clauses of distribution agree-
ments are likely to be invalidated by the courts of Member States. On this point, the dispute 
arises regarding allocation of liability in the case of an invalidation.  
According to the Directive, while the unfair term itself should not be binding on the con-
sumer176, the whole contract remains valid, so long as this is possible without the offending 
clause, regarding the legal nature of the contract177. Nevertheless, the Directive does not 
offer any clearance as to what should fill in the gap of the invalidated term. Although, as 
the general approach of the contract laws of European Member States suggests, when an 
express term in a contract is invalidated by operation of law, the gap that has formed is 
filled with an implied term. Accordingly, rules designated by the contract law of the coun-
try whose law governs the agreement should replace the invalidated unfair term. Therefore, 
Each party of the contractual relationship would be responsible from their faults, namely 
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mal performance, without any exception. In other words, in event of an invalidation of lia-
bility terms, everybody would be accountable of their own culpa. 
The above overview suggests that, in the case of distribution agreements, since the exemp-
tion of liability and indemnification clauses are likely to be invalidated, distributors would 
be responsible of their faults, namely any damages caused by their actions, such as non-
performance or failure to fulfil its contractual obligations. 
Practically, the abovementioned would have two implications; 
• If an action of the distributor causes damage to an end-user, distributor would be li-
able, and 
• If the distributor fails to perform its obligations with reasonable care, damaging the 
developer, the developer would be entitled to compensation. 
For instance, supposing a developer creates an app, distributed by Apple via its App Store, 
which provides an agenda that records hearing times, dates and places for lawyers, the IOS 
Developer Program License Agreement grants Apple the right to remove the app from app 
store at its sole discretion and without liability thereof. Thereupon, if Apple removes the 
mentioned application upon an unfounded notice of infringement, said removal would, pos-
sibly, damage both the developer and the end-user. On this wise, a lawyer end-user of the 
application would be prevented from accessing his professional agenda which would lead 
to a professional loss. According to IOS Developer Program Licensing Agreement, none-
theless, Apple would not be liable from any of the mentioned losses178 insomuch that, it 
would be the developer who is accountable for the end-user`s losses. Nevertheless, as ex-
plained before, in the case of a consumer developer, the liability clauses thereof would be 
invalidated by virtue of the Unfair Terms Directive. Consequently, the distributor would be 
liable from the losses incurring by the developer and the end-user. 
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2.4.1.2. Liability in end-user license agreements contracted with 
consumer developers 
The EULAs, similarly to distribution agreements, usually consist of boilerplate standard 
terms that are provided to end-users via click-wrap format. On this wise, when an end-user 
is a consumer, clauses of the EULA may be subject to unfairness test and consequently be 
invalidated. The aforementioned may result to a false security in end-users, who might ex-
pect the other party of the contract, namely the developers, to be professional, not consum-
er.  
Nonetheless, the application of the Unfair Terms Directive is contingent upon the agree-
ment’s being a consumer contract. A consumer contract should be concluded between a 
consumer and a professional.  In other words, terms of a contract can only be invalidated 
on the grounds of unfairness when the contract is a B2C contract. 
Therefore, in the cases where developers are consumers, end-users are deprived of the pro-
tection of the Unfair Terms Directive, rendering them bound by EULAs in entirety, includ-
ing the seemingly unfair clauses, insomuch as they are compatible with the rules of the 
contract laws of Member States.   
Having said that, it should also be stressed that the mentioned situation, regarding end-
users who cannot exercise their consumer rights, has several consequences regarding the 
applicability of the liability clauses of terms of service agreements between the end-user 
and the distributor. Accordingly, the following  chapter will assess the issues thereof . 
2.4.1.3. Liability in terms of service agreements contracted with 
consumer developers 
The contractual relationships between mobile application distributors and end-users are 
determined by virtue of pre-formulated terms of service agreements. Commonly, in order 
to be able to use the services offered by the mobile application distributor, namely to pur-
chase an app, end-users need to have an account in the distribution platform. During regis-
tration processes of the mentioned accounts, end-users are offered a click or browse wrap 
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agreement, namely the terms of services. It is not possible for an end-user to acquire an 
account without agreeing to the terms of services. Additionally, the terms of service clauses 
hardly vary, from distributor to distributor, in main characteristics. As is explained in for-
mer chapters, they all include clauses, denying any liability of distributors and designating 
it as the sole agent or intermediate between the licensor, developer, and licensee, end-user. 
As matters stand, end-users are, practically, forced to agree to the terms of services they are 
“offered”. 
Here, the problem emerges when end-users are denied any remuneration for the damages 
they may suffer through a mobile application. As is previously explained, when a developer 
is a consumer, disclaimer clauses of the EULA, typically waiving liability of the developer 
entirely, would be valid. Since terms of service agreements, also, make use of similar 
waiver of liability clauses, in an attempt to free distributors from liability, the verbatim 
implementation of the said contracts would leave damaged end-users without any chance to 
seek relief.  
For instance, Apple requests developers, using Apple Maps Services in their applications, 
to embed a disclaimer in the EULAs they provide with relation to them179. As the name 
suggests, Apple Maps Services are controlled and provided by Apple. Therefore, Apple is 
responsible for its Maps Services’ accuracy. Accordingly, when an erroneous information 
in Apple Maps Services, embedded in a mobile application of a consumer developer, caus-
es damage to a consumer end-user, the EULA and terms of service agreements thereof pre-
vent the end-user from claiming any compensation from any party of the relationship. On 
this case, developer’s liability constitutes liability of an information society services pro-
vider’s liability from third party products. Had the developer not been a consumer, the 
terms of EULA exempting him/her from liability in such instances would be invalidated by 
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virtue of unfair terms protection. But, as presence of a non-consumer developer renders the 
EULA a C2C agreement, unfair terms protection regarding consumers would not be appli-
cable to the case at hand, thusly validating the disclaimer of liabilities thereof. All in all, in 
this situation, a word for word implementation of the disclaimers of terms of services 
agreement would bring about an evident unfairness to the disadvantage of damaged end-
user, particularly with regards to the culpability of Apple in the given situation.  
For reasons given, mentioned pre-formulated terms generate a significant imbalance to the 
detriment of the end-users, who does not have any other option than agreeing to such seem-
ingly unfair clauses. Therefore, in mentioned situations, application of Unfair Terms Di-
rective may render exemption clauses of terms and service agreements invalid. Conse-
quently, by operation of law, the distributor becomes liable from the damages caused by its 
actions. 
Conforming to the Electronic Commerce Directive, mobile platforms can be classified un-
der hosting intermediaries180.  The Directive adopts a horizontal approach, ergo it’s safe 
harbour rules can be applied to all content and all kind of infringements, be it a criminal 
offence or an economical damage181. To this extend, in mobile application relationships’ 
case, the Directive’s safe harbour rules can be relevant to distributors’ liability in damages 
incurring by the end-user. The adverse interpretation of mentioned would suggest that dis-
tributors can be held liable in cases that do not satisfy the regulated criteria of Electronic 
Commerce Directive’s safe harbour clauses. Pursuant to the Directive, distributors are to be 
excused from liability in certain cases182. In addition to article 14’s criteria of no actual 
knowledge and action in the case of it, the Recital 42 of the Directive designates another 
criterion for a hosting intermediate’s exemption from liability. On this wise, the Recital 
holds that, in order to be exempted from liability, the hosting services should not be ac-
tive183, that is to say the activity of the intermediate should be solely technical in nature. 
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The CJEU elucidated the Recital’s aforementioned criterion in  Google Adwords184 and 
eBay185 cases. In the Google Adwords case, the Court stressed the relevance of the role 
played by the provider in drafting of a commercial message186, in addition to the neutrality 
requirement for providers in order to benefit from safe harbour exemptions. Thereupon, the 
Court interpreted neutrality as hosting provider’s lack of knowledge or control over the 
data it stores in both Google and eBay cases187. 
The eBay cases examined operation of online marketplaces in the light of the Directive’s 
safe harbour rules188. The Court held online marketplaces, which set terms of services for 
both end-users and sellers, as befitting to safe harbour provisions. Notwithstanding, the 
Court also discussed some factors pushing the provider away from the safe harbour189, such 
as the situations where the provider gives assistance to the sellers, optimising the presenta-
tion of the offers for sale or promoting offers190. Additionally, in the same decision, the 
Court particularized providers’ content investigations, undertaken on their own initiatives, 
as endangering unawareness criteria of the Directives safe harbour rules, which demands 
the provider to have no knowledge on the infringement191. 
Mobile application distributor platforms can be analogised to online merchants like 
eBay192. Pursuant to Court’s abovementioned benchmarks, mobile application distributors 
tend to abandon their neutral position seeing that the mobile applications are marketed in a 
manner determined in distributors’ sole discretion. Furthermore, distributors risk being 
deemed to have undertaken an investigation of their own initiative, forasmuch as they 
screen all applications before allowing them in their distribution platforms193 in addition to 
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their control over both the APIs and toolkits used to build the applications194. Thence, ac-
cording to the criteria laid by the CJEU, mobile application distributors would typically be 
deemed ineligible to be exempted from liability, for their role in mobile application devel-
opment relationships exceed the passiveness barrier of Recital 42. 
Truly, in cases where both of the parties of a contract are private persons but one of them is 
represented by a professional as commercial agent etc., the involvement of the professional 
agent could lead to a situation where the other private person is in the same need of a pro-
tection akin to B2C relationships’195.  Following the ideas along these lines, Sweden and 
Denmark regarded such contracts as consumer transactions, in some cases, holding the pro-
fessional agent responsible together with the private person principle196.  
Since they are not between an agent acting in behalf of a person and another person, the 
mentioned seems not to be applicable to mobile application distribution platforms’ terms of 
services agreements directly. On the other hand, all mobile application purchases would 
result to a contract that is concluded via an agent, namely the distributor. Thus, even if the 
aforementioned issue regarding agency seems not to be anent to the terms of service 
agreement themselves, regarding the overall relationship, said approach, concerning 
agents’ liability in the dealings, should also held applicable to them. In such manner, when 
the developers are consumers, some Member States designate distributors accountable from 
end-users’ losses, despite the exemption clauses in terms of service agreements. 
2.4.2. When the developer is not a consumer 
In the event where developers are not consumers, the liability issues in mobile application 
distribution relationships showcase a different situation than the abovementioned. This 
fundamentally derives from the fact that, in this case, the nature of the contract between 
developer and distributor changes to B2B. Said deprives developer from the protection of 
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Unfair Terms Directive, consequently affecting the liability balance in the whole relation-
ship. 
Following sub-chapters will discuss the allocation of liability in contractual relationship 
between non-consumer developers, distributors and end-users. 
2.4.2.1. Liability issues in mobile application distribution agreements 
contracted with non-consumer developers 
As an intermediary facilitating electronic commerce and providing internet retail services 
without taking the title to the goods197, mobile application distribution services were previ-
ously classified as being likely to agency relationship. On this wise, distributors constitute 
intermediate between the licensor developer and the licensee end-user.  
In an agency relationship, agents are normally not expected to carry the risks. All the same, 
depending on the agency relationship, it is clear that the principle would be entitled to a 
redress if the agent causes damage to the principle. Said right to redress would also emerge 
in the cases where a developer has to compensate the end-user’s damages, brought about by 
the distributor. However, in the mentioned situations, the liability clauses of distribution 
agreements come into operation, preventing any such developer claims of remedy.  
When a developer cannot be classified as a consumer, the distribution contract between the 
developer and the distributor constitutes a B2B agreement. The idea of fair practice thereof 
dictates that each contracting party takes responsibility for its own risks and does not undu-
ly attempt to transfer them to other parties. Yet, European law provides no regulation re-
garding unfair contract terms in B2B agreements. In Europe, the contract law of the Mem-
ber State, law of which is applicable to the agreement at hand198, governs B2B dealings. As 
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its primary principle is contractual freedom, the contract law holds the parties free to de-
termine the content of the contract199.  
As all contract law systems are established on the principle of contractual freedom, in mo-
bile application distribution relationships, granted that the developer is not a consumer, the 
distribution agreement would be valid as it is agreed upon, including the seemingly unfair 
liability terms thereof.  
The question here emerges, with regards to whether the mandatory rules of European unfair 
terms acquis can be applicable to unfair terms of such distribution agreements. The party 
that makes use of the standard terms, the distributor in the case at hand, enjoys a rather 
broad range of information advantages, namely the advantages of knowing precisely what 
the contract consists of200. These advantages are more apparent in the circumstances where 
the other party to the contract is a consumer or a small-medium enterprise201. As the former 
situation is already covered by the consumer acquis, the controversy, here, arises regarding 
the advantageous position of standard term user distributors, when the other party to the 
contract is a small-medium enterprise developer. The distributor, as a standard terms con-
tracts user, utilizes its superior bargaining powers in order to impose the unfair terms, such 
as the liability clauses, on the developer, who, in small-medium enterprise developers’ 
case, can be enduring similar constraints to any consumer. Accordingly, in some cases re-
lating to small-medium enterprises’, interests in protecting the consumer against standard 
terms contracts do prevail. Indeed, Nordic countries, Germany202, Portugal, Estonia, Aus-
tria, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovenia and the UK have followed a similar ap-
proach by rendering judicial review of all unfair terms, including the terms in B2B agree-
ments, possible. Hence, the liability clauses of distribution agreements may, too, be invali-
dated in several Member States, insomuch as they hold the developer inequitably responsi-
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ble from the distributor’s actions. In a similar approach, such unfair transfers of risk, which 
burdens a party with compensating faults of the other203, are listed amongst unfair B2B 
practices by the Green Paper on subject204.   
On the other hand, given the governing law of the contract, does not adopt such an exten-
sive approach to the Unfair Terms Directive, the liability terms of the distribution agree-
ments would be enforceable. This would hold developer liable from any damage incurring 
by the end-user caused by the mobile application. Correspondingly, the absolute implemen-
tations of liability clauses of distribution agreements deprive developers of the right to 
claim redress from distributors, regarding damages generated by the latter. 
On the other hand, if the Member State had extended the scope of the Unfair Terms Di-
rective to include B2B terms, liability clauses of distribution agreements would, presuma-
bly, be rendered unfair, thence unenforceable, particularly with respect to situations, where, 
the distributor tries to shift risk by virtue of liability and indemnification clauses.  
2.4.2.2. Liability issues in end-user license agreements contracted with 
non-consumer developers 
The fundamental impact of a developer’s stance as a consumer on its relationship with the 
consumer end-user is that, it renders the EULA a B2C agreement. The European consumer 
acquis grants consumers significant protection regarding agreements contracted between 
the consumer and a trader, namely the B2C contracts205. The mentioned protection is the 
most apparent in unfair standard terms’ case, for the consumer acquis renders them unen-
forceable against consumers. 
Particularly the liability clauses of EULAs, attempting to regulate an “as is” basis for the 
application purchases, seemingly meet the requirements of the Unfair Terms Directive’s 
criteria for a term’s invalidation. As previously explained, mobile application EULAs typi-
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cally consist of standard terms, which make use of extended disclaimers of liability, desig-
nating the developer immune from any responsibility. Such clauses create significant im-
balance between the rights and obligations of the developer and the end-user since they 
deprive the end-user of the right to claim most of the damages. Consequently to the Euro-
pean consumer acquis, therefore, the liability disclaimers of EULAs are likely to be invali-
dated206. On these circumstances, contract law would govern the liability claims. In such 
wise, the developer would be liable from the damages he caused to  the end-user. 
2.4.2.3. Liability issues in terms of service  agreements contracted with 
non-consumer developers 
Concerning end-users, distributors undertake several roles. First thereof is the agent be-
tween the end-user and the developer, followed by the cloud service provider and the host-
ing intermediate. Thusly, this chapter will discuss the liability issues between the distribu-
tor and the end-user, with regards to each role of the distributor. 
As a cloud service provider, the distributor undertakes the obligation to provide the end-
user the SaaS207 services, namely the provision of a platform for storage and utilization of 
mobile applications. In other words, the distributor is obliged to provide the storage, for 
software, the end-user purchases, and relevant data, created by the end-user through or 
within the software, in addition to providing the end-user access to them. Accordingly, 
when the distributor removes a mobile application from its distribution platform or disables 
the application, it would be in default of its cloud service obligations, and thusly in breach 
of the contract.  
The terms of service agreements, attempt to dismiss the distributors liability in aforemen-
tioned breaches. Moreover, the terms of services transfer such liability to the developer, 
who is a third party to cloud service provision relationship. At the first glance, said seems 
not to be significantly unfair regarding the end-user. Although, since it compels the end-
                                                
 
206 Unfair Terms Directive art.3(1) 
207 Hon(2014) p.3 
 52 
user to seek a remedy from the developer, instead of the distributor, such a transfer of lia-
bility can sometimes create unnecessary burden to the damaged. By way of explanation, 
expecting the end-user to seek redress from a developer, which is mostly either a natural 
person or a small-medium size enterprise, renders the compensation process of an already 
damaged end-user even harder.  
Firstly, when compared to mobile application distributors, which are big enterprises enjoy-
ing million dollars of yearly revenues, developers suggest a rather feeble source of remedy 
for the end-users.  
Furthermore, by reason of several regulations, such as data protection rules, distributors are 
compelled to have a branch in the territory of the Europe Union, which renders them easier 
to commence a litigation against, compared to developers who can be based in anywhere in 
the world.  
Consequently, when litigation costs and durations are considered, mentioned transfer of 
liability seems to be creating significant imbalance between the obligations and rights of 
the end-user and the distributor. So, in pursuance to the Unfair Terms Directive, such liabil-
ity clauses are likely to be invalidated; thereupon holding the distributor liable from the 
damages caused by it’s removal or disabling of an application. In accordance with the said, 
when the distributor removes an app from its platform upon an unfounded notice of in-
fringement, the end-used suffering loses therefrom would be entitled to seek remedy direct-
ly from the distributor itself. 
As a general rule, the agency relationship exempts the agent from any responsibility, con-
cerning the damages emerging from or during the performance, late performance or non-
performance of the contract. Here, the issue emerges when the end-user suffers losses 
caused by the agent distributor. Regarding the mobile application license purchase relation-
ship, the distributor does not constitute a party, namely the distributor is a third party to the 
said dealing in particular. On this wise, end-user’s losses occurring in relation to a mobile 
application but resulted from the actions of the distributor, should be classified as a tort, not 
a contractual default. Nevertheless, the liability clauses of terms of service agreements 
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avert such tort claims and, similarly to all other kinds of losses, burden the developer in-
stead. Thence, the abovementioned explanation on the unfairness of such clauses would be 
also valid regarding the agency role of the distributor. In this direction, as exemption and 
transfer of liability clauses would be unenforceable, when the distributor performs its obli-
gations as an agent poorly, for instance when it does not approve the security bug updates 
timely, the distributor would directly be liable, to the end-user, from the losses incurring by 
him. 
Finally, considering the hosting intermediate role of the distributor, the issues thereof con-
stitutes the hosting intermediaries liability from third party content. Regarding mobile ap-
plication relationships, the mentioned indicates distributors’ liability to end-users from the 
mobile applications they host in their platforms. The Electronic Commerce Directive regu-
lation and distributor’s stance thereupon was explained previously regarding the liability 
issues in the relationship between the developer and the distributor. Pursuant to liability 
exemption rules of the Electronic Commerce Directive, since they are not likely to fulfil the 
criteria of passive intermediate, distributors cannot benefit from the designated safe har-
bours. Therefore, distributors can be held liable from damages end-users suffer through an 
unlawful or faulty mobile application. 
Again, the liability disclaimers of terms of service agreements hinder end-users from seek-
ing compensation from distributors. On this case, however,  what constitutes the matter of 
discussion is the losses generated by not distributors, but the third party content. Conse-
quently, in such cases, the former unfairness assessment fails to suggest a strong ground for 
invalidation of such terms. In other words, when the hosting provider role of the distributor 
is considered, the liability disclaimers of terms of service agreements seems to remain en-
forceable, namely continuing to prevent the end-user from compensating his losses from 
the distributor.  
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3. Conclusion 
The discussion above demonstrated the significant effects of the European consumer ac-
quis, especially the Unfair Terms Directive, on the allocation of liability in mobile applica-
tion relationships.  
On this wise, it is safe to suggest that, the manner of implementation of the mobile applica-
tion contracts in Europe varies significantly from its counterparts in, particularly, the USA. 
Contrarily to law of the latter, European law, leaves distributors a relatively narrower field 
to enjoy their dominant power over the complete mobile application relationship.   
The sole circumstance that the terms of the mobile application contracts could be imple-
mented literally is when all parties of the dealings are non consumers. Supposing one party 
of the mobile application relationship constitutes a consumer within the meaning of Euro-
pean consumer acquis,  the Unfair Terms Directive interferes in the contractual relation-
ship. Results of the mention interference are particularly distinct when examined with rela-
tion to developers’ position as consumer. On this wise, previous chapters explained that, in 
pursuance to the European consumer acquis, a natural person developer, acting outside the 
scope of his profession, business, craft or trade, constitutes a consumer. 
EULAs may regulate a relationship seemingly germane to developers and the end-users, 
although, actually even the terms of the said agreements are previously formulated by the 
distributors. According to distribution agreements, developers do not have to prepare their 
own EULAs to serve the end-users. In the absence of a new EULA the draft EULAs pro-
vided by distributors come into force. Still, even if developers choose to supply their own 
EULAs, the new EULAs have to be compatible with distributors’ draft EULAs. Therefore, 
all three mobile application contract terms are, in essence, designated by distributors. Ac-
cordingly the terms thereof safeguards distributors’ best interests. Likewise, the liability 
clauses governing the mobile application relationships, too, expressly favour the distribu-
tors, liberating them from any form of liability by virtue of indemnification, disclaimer of 
warranty and limitation of liability clauses. Additionally, mobile application contracts des-
ignate developers liable from any losses incurring by the end-users. 
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Thusly, the above chapters assessed the unfairness and therefore enforceability of liability 
rules of mobile application agreements, with regards to the stance of developer as consum-
er. 
Regarding mobile application distribution relationships, in the case of a consumer develop-
er, the liability rules holding developer liable from damages generated by the distributor are 
likely to be invalidated in Europe by virtue of the Unfair Terms Directive. Unfair terms in 
B2B agreements is not harmonised by the European acquis, however some Member States 
extend the protection bestowed upon the consumers, to include some legal persons like 
small-medium enterprises or charity organisations. Therefore, the liability issues in distri-
bution relationships, the developer of which are not consumers varies, depending on the 
Member State governing it. 
As to the EULAs, when the developer is a consumer, the end-users cannot benefit from the 
unfair terms protection regardless of their stance of consumers. The cited stems from the 
fact that, in such instances, the EULAs constitute C2C agreements and therefore does not 
qualify for the assessment of unfairness of the European consumer acquis. However, since 
the mentioned deprives the consumer end-users from rights they are granted against profes-
sionals, it may render the exemption of liability clauses in terms of service agreements be-
tween them and distributors unfair. Following these lines, clauses in terms of service 
agreements that designates distributors unaccountable from any aspect of the mobile appli-
cation relationship may as well be invalidated, thusly allowing the damaged end-users to 
seek remedy directly from the distributors, especially with regards to damages generated by 
distributors. As to the liability issues in terms of service agreements, between distributors 
and consumer end-users, if the developer is not a consumer, the liability of distributors 
from damages caused by their own actions depend on which aspect of the service provided 
is concerned. In other words, if the liability concerns the cloud or agency services provided 
by the distributor, and the distributor is culpable thereof,  the transfer of liability on the 
developers is likely to be deemed unfair for the end-user, as directing claims to developer 
entails significant litigation cost and lowers the end-user’s chances to receive a remedy. 
Nevertheless, regarding distributors’ liability from damages not generated by them, the 
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transfer of liability terms thereof seem not to be satisfying the significant imbalance criteri-
on of Unfair Terms Directive, thusly preventing the invalidating effect of the Directive. 
Consequently, in instances where the losses are not caused by the distributor, terms of ser-
vice agreement’s liability rules, holding developer responsible, are enforceable. 
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